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DISTANT NEIGHBOURS ? :
JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS REVISITED*
Brian Bridges
Lingnan University
Abstract
Japan’s relations with the two Koreas have remained complicated
and controversial, as recent anti-Japanese protests in South Korea
demonstrate. This paper discusses the progress in bringing
reconciliation between Japan and South Korea through an
examination of four elements in the bilateral relationship: the
historical legacies, the economic competition, the security
imperatives (including the relationship with North Korea), and the
flows of popular culture and people. It argues that the slowly
improving bilateral Japan-South Korea relationship, to which
growing economic interdependence, heightened interest in popular
culture, and shared beliefs in peace and stability in North-east Asia
all contribute, is nonetheless still subject to strong emotional surges
and responses to perceived slights on both sides. The recent upsurge
in tension, primarily over how Japan views its past, suggests that
reconciliation will continue to be a slow and even contradictory
process.

Twelve years ago I published a book on Japan’s relations with the
two Koreas in which I took as a sub-title ‘From Antagonism to
Adjustment’. One of the justifications for that sub-title was my belief
that at the time - just after the end of the Cold War - the changes and
uncertainties in the international order were mirrored by transitional
but nonetheless beneficial processes in the triangular relations
between North and South Korea and between those two countries
*

This is a revised version of a paper entitled ‘Not So Distant Neighbours?:
Korea-Japan Relations Revisited’, presented at the Workshop on Korea Today: Media
and Modernity, hosted by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, 8
April 2005. This Workshop received sponsorship from the Korea Foundation. I am
grateful for the comments by participants at the Workshop on the earlier version of
this paper.
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and Japan. While I was broadly optimistic about the processes of
reconciliation apparent at the time in all three relationships around
the triangle, I did add the caveat that ‘emotional legacies, ideological
remnants, economic competition, and differing national security
perspectives’ would continue to influence the complex
inter-relationships (Bridges 1993: 173).
This year, 2005, is a particularly appropriate year to review the state
of Korea-Japan relations. This June sees the fortieth anniversary of
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and South
Korea through the Basic Treaty and the event is being celebrated by
a large number of events in both countries as well as by exchanges
of visits by senior politicians (and, just possibly, by the Japanese
Crown Prince and Princess going to South Korea). However, this
year also sees in August the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the
Second World War (the end of the Japanese occupation of Korea)
and in November the hundredth anniversary of the Japan-Korea
treaty which paved the way for that colonial occupation.
In this particular paper, I wish to focus primarily on the Japan-South
Korea relationship, although clearly that cannot be considered in
isolation from the two countries’ relations with North Korea. I will
examine the state of relations under four broad headings: historical
legacies, economic power, security imperatives, and what might
loosely and rather flippantly be described as ‘people power’ and then
discuss how these underlying elements and more recent
developments contribute to or hinder the process of reconciliation
between Koreans and Japanese.
Legacies of history
For both the Japanese and the Koreans, whether living in the North
or the South, the past has a strong influence on how the present is
perceived. Memories of the harsh Japanese colonial period act as an
emotional backdrop to Japan’s involvement in contemporary Korean
affairs. It took twenty years after the end of the Second World War
for Japan to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea and it
has still not recognised the North. The relevance of history to
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today’s relationships continues to be evident, as shown most recently
in the popular and governmental reactions in South Korea to
Japanese actions over the outstanding territorial issue and Japanese
history textbooks.
Historical consciousness in the two countries involves ‘emotions and
perceptions and images in the whole population of Japan and South
Korea, which may not necessarily be correct’, but are nonetheless
widely felt (Ducke 2002, p. 31). On the South Korean side, the
negative images of Japan are strongly based on and, arguably, help
to contribute to the construction of Korean self-identity through the
opposition to and contrast with Japan. On the Japanese side, a
lingering superiority complex intermingles with, at least until the
past decade or so, a degree of indifference about the neighbouring
Koreans (one survey in the early 1990s showed that 20% of Japanese
did not even realise that Korea had been a Japanese colony (Ducke
2002, p. 41)).
Three issues seem to have become a measure of the pervasiveness of
historical legacies in this bilateral relationship: apologies, territorial
disputes and compensation. According to Lily Feldman, ‘apology
for historical wrongs….is a prerequisite for fundamental departure’
(Feldman 1999, p. 335); Suzanne Choi and Roman David in their
analysis of forgiveness and apology also note a tendency across
much of the literature to reach a similar conclusion (Choi and David
2004). Certainly, Koreans have long argued for proper apologies
from the Japanese side - and the German example is often cited
favourably by comparison - while the Japanese tend to feel that these
criticisms are unjustified and even counter-productive. Nonetheless,
the Japanese government has been more willing since the early
1990s to issue apologetic statements (see the verbal comments by
prime ministers Hosokawa Morihiro and Murayama Tomiichi during
1993-95 and, most importantly, the written apology by Obuchi
Keizo in 1998). These conciliatory gestures have not prevented
certain Japanese right-wing politicians, including sometimes those in
cabinet positions, from making occasional so-called ‘reckless
remarks’ about the colonial period. However, at least the Japanese
government has reacted more sensitively to these episodes by
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apologising and sacking offending ministers (Ducke 2002, pp.
35-38). Nonetheless, linked to this apology issue is also South
Korean disquiet over current prime minister Koizumi Junichiro’s
repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine (and his refusal to discontinue
them) and periodic revisions to Japanese history textbooks, of which
the most recent occurred in the spring of 2005 (on the background to
the history textbooks disputes with Korea see Lee 1985: pp.
141-164).
South Korea and Japan have a long-standing territorial dispute over
two tiny rock islands known as Tokdo in Korean and Takeshima in
Japanese. Both sides parade various historical and legal justifications
for their respective claims, the South Koreans maintain a maritime
guard unit there, and rather ritualistically the Japanese make annual
diplomatic protests and the South Korean side responds in kind.
While it is a long-simmering dispute, over the past five decades it
has tended to become prominent only when tension has entered the
relationship for some other reason (Bridges 1993, pp. 65-66).
Therefore, it is unusual that this year it seems that it is the raising of
the Japanese profile over this claim, primarily through the nearby
Japanese prefecture of Shimane’s designation of a ‘Takeshima Day’,
which is helping to bring some tension back into the bilateral
relationship.
More consistently contentious in recent years, however, has been the
issue of compensation for the victims of Japanese wartime policies,
in particular the so-called ‘comfort women’. The 1965 Basic Treaty
saw South Korea giving up all compensation claims in return for
Japanese economic assistance, but the ‘comfort women’, whose
plight only began to be publicly acknowledged by Japanese veterans
and surviving women in the late 1980s, were not specifically
covered. The Japanese government, no doubt wary of setting
precedents, has refused to accept governmental responsibility but has
instead made some movement forward by encouraging Japanese
companies to set up an ‘Asian Women Fund’ to disburse some
financial compensation. Efforts by former ‘comfort women’ to use
the courts to gain compensation have been comparatively
unsuccessful, the most recent court case finally failing in November
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2004 after a 13-year legal process (Ducke 2002, pp. 56-67; Lewis
2002, pp. 1261-28). Yet, in December 2004, when for the first time a
Japanese cabinet official met former ‘comfort women’, an apology
was specifically made. However, in contrast to past Korean
governments’ low-key approach to all aspects of the compensation
issue, in March this year South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun
resurrected the compensation issue, arguing that: ‘We need to bring
to light the historical truth, apologise and reflect, pay compensation
should there be things that need to be compensated, and reconcile’
(Chosun Ilbo, English internet edition, 1 March 2005). Unification
Minister Chung Dong-yong then followed up by specifically calling
on Japan to compensate those victims not covered by the 1965 treaty
(Korea Times, 17 March 2005).
How far do these historical issues interact with the broader
relationship? Two recent periods can be considered important. The
first relates to 1998, the first year of the Kim Dae-jung
administration. Leaders of countries, especially when visiting other
countries, are often tempted to indulge in the rhetoric of proclaiming
a ‘new era’ in relations. This kind of rhetoric has been seen in the
case of Korea-Japan relations too - and not infrequently the
follow-up has been less than substantial - yet, officials and
academics that I interviewed in both Seoul and Tokyo last autumn
did comment on the significance of the attitude and policies of Kim
Dae-jung. Kim altered the dynamics of the Japan-South Korea
relationship in two important ways, one relating to the historical past
and the other to the relationship with North Korea (which will be
dealt with separately later on).
Kim did try hard to translate some of the oft-repeated rhetoric of
improving the bilateral relationship into reality. By progressively
lifting the bans on many items of Japanese popular culture and also
on certain Japanese manufactured goods, as well as by using the
opportunity of his visit to Japan in October 1998 to show a
willingness to put aside the habit of continually referring to the
legacies of the past and to think more about the future potentialities,
Kim propagated a more positive view of Japan than many of his
immediate predecessors (Lewis 2002, pp.120-126). His approach
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was reciprocated by the Japanese, who proved willing to give him a
form of written apology on his visit; a concession which was not
accorded to the more abrasive Chinese President Jiang Zemin on his
visit to Japan one month later. The second period, relating to the
events of this year, will be discussed later.
Economic power
Deep economic links have been established between Japan and
South Korea, but over the past four decades issues such as trade
imbalances, tariffs and market access restrictions, aid and
technology transfer have often become politicised. Undoubtedly,
part of the reason for this lies in the highly complementary nature of
the two economies; both export manufactured goods, import energy
and raw materials, and have had highly protected agricultural
sectors.
Trade between South Korea and Japan increased significantly in the
second half of the 1980s and this increasing trend has broadly
continued during the 1990s, although the prolonged recession in
Japan since the early 1990s and the 1997-98 financial crisis in South
Korea have undoubtedly impacted on and slowed down this growth.
Total bilateral trade has grown from US $ 33.3 billion in 1991 to
$43.1 billion in 2001 and to $67.8 billion in 2004. Japan has been an
important investor in South Korea, ranking behind the United States
and the European Union as the third largest investor in South Korea,
with an accumulated US$ 13.3 billion by the end of 2003, with the
investment roughly equally in the manufacturing and the service
sectors. South Korea has been much less active in investing in Japan
(according to South Korean figures investing only $989 million by
the end of 2003), mostly in the trading sector (China Daily, 25
February 2005). By way of comparison, it should be noted that in
only just over a decade, the cumulative total of South Korean
investment in China has exceeded $14 billion.
There has continued to be one important structural issue relating to
bilateral trade, the trade imbalance which has been continuously in
Japan’s favour. This, of course, has in large part reflected the
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structural differences in the two economies. The trade balance was
$8.5 billion in Japan’s favour in 1991 and had grown to $13 billion
by 1997 before dropping drastically to $4.6 billion in 1998 when the
financial crisis severely cut back South Korean imports from
everywhere, including Japan. South Korean sensitivities to this
imbalance have been reflected in the habit, at least until the
mid-1980s, of citing the trade deficit in cumulative terms since 1965,
restrictions on imports of certain Japanese products (for many years
Seoul was the only Asian capital city with none of the ubiquitous
Japanese cars), and frequent complaints to the Japanese about the
need for better access to the Japanese market for Korean products.
Nonetheless, in recent years some of the heat seems to have come
out of the trade issues and the overall health of the economic
relationship can be considered to be a positive development in
Korea-Japan relations, or as Lee Jung-hoon and Moon Chung-in
argue, ‘South Korea’s economic calculus has been radically shifting
from a confrontational posture to a more cooperative one’ (Lee and
Moon 2002, p.160). While Koreans remain unhappy about the once
again rising trade deficits (by 2004 the gap had grown again to $ 24
billion) the figures appear less politically sensitive. In accordance
with the requirements of the World Trade Organisation, the South
Korean restrictions on various Japanese products, which had been in
force since the late 1970s under an import diversification
programme, have been progressively dismantled and by mid-1999
had been completely removed (Cheong 2004, p.223).
Two elements, in particular, can be seen as contributing to this
feeling of more positive economic interdependence. Firstly, is the
extent to which South Korean and Japanese companies, previously
fierce rivals, have come to cooperate and collaborate even in some
areas of high technology. Up to the 1990s technology transfer was
seen as a one-way street from Japan to South Korea, but with the
Koreans often complaining about Japanese reticence to transfer the
latest technologies. Recently, however, the prolonged recession in
Japan has meant that Japanese companies, increasingly concerned
about the costs of staying competitive, have become much more
willing to collaborate on an equal basis with South Korean
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companies in areas such as semi-conductor development. For
example, in December 2004 Sony signed a cross-licensing
agreement with Samsung Electronics to share patents across product
lines. In addition, South Korean companies are even beating their
Japanese counterparts to orders from Japanese companies, such as
the order for 8 ships placed by Nippon Yusen with Hyundai Heavy
Industries late last year (South China Morning Post, 8 November
2004)
Secondly, belatedly following on what has become a growing trend
around the Asian Pacific region, especially for certain South-east
Asian countries, Japan and South Korea are moving towards a free
trade agreement (FTA). In contrast to the emphasis placed on
globalization by the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Roh
administration has demonstrated a strong interest in regional
linkages. Although the Roh government managed to conclude its
first ever FTA with Chile (which finally came into force, after
overcoming considerable domestic resistance from Korean farmers,
in April 2004), it was more interested to develop such arrangements
with its Asian neighbours, including Japan. Japan, too, had been
rather slow off the mark in negotiating FTAs and its first one, with
Singapore, was only concluded in January 2002.
Studies on the costs and benefits of a Korea-Japan FTA, carried out
bilaterally by think-tanks, business organisations and eventually
government officials, started in the late 1990s and were generally
favourable towards such an agreement, but not until December 2003
did formal governmental-level negotiations begin. The Korean
government does expect that in the short-run there would be a
further increase in the trade deficit with Japan on the entry into force
of a FTA, but that in the longer-term the cooperative benefits would
be greater (Cheong 2004, pp. 228-234). Although business
organisations are supportive in general, clearly certain sectors in
each country are concerned about the specific impact on them. On
the Korean side, the car industry and the smaller and medium-sized
electronics components-makers are worried about a flood of
Japanese products coming in, while on the Japanese side the worry is
more about the competitive agricultural and fishery products coming
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in from Korea (Nihon keizai shimbun, 1 March 2004). Nonetheless,
both governments do seem committed to developing this FTA, with
a target date of the end of 2005, but disagreements over agricultural
trade issues had brought the negotiations almost to a standstill by
early 2005 and recent tensions in other aspects of the relationship do
not bode well for early progress. Nonetheless, conclusion of the FTA
remains an objective for both sides’ officials and businessmen.
Security imperatives
At the height of the Cold War, the United States had hopes that its
two allies, South Korea and Japan, could work together in an
anti-communist bloc, but, although as Victor Cha has argued a form
of ‘quasi-alliance’ emerged between these two countries, mutual
antipathies and differing perspectives handicapped the degree of
political and security cooperation (Cha 1999). South Korea was
preoccupied, understandably, with the North Korean threat, whereas
the Japanese worried more about the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold
War world, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
concerns over suspected North Korean nuclear weapon development
brought the Japanese closer to South Korean perspectives on the
importance of managing North Korea.
Yet, despite all the efforts to coordinate policies between South
Korea, Japan and the United States over the North Korean issue, it
has to be said that there have still been subtle differences in
approaches and perspectives between the South Koreans and the
Japanese through both of the nuclear crises of 1993-94 and 2002 to
present. In the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, South
Korea’s Kim Young-sam administration was the more inconsistent
in its policies, being particularly sensitive to being excluded from
US-North Korea negotiations. Japan, on the other hand, expressed
concern over the nuclear issue but stressed its inability to do
anything to assist (and showed its marked reluctance to consider any
action such as sanctions) (Ducke 2002, pp. 143-149). Nonetheless,
both countries were relieved that a diplomatic deal (the October
1994 Agreed Framework) rather than war had solved the crisis, both
agreed to participate in the funding and management of the Korean
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Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), and, with Japanese
ministerial statements becoming blunter about the North Korean
‘threat’, they appeared to be closer to similar strategic perceptions.
This strategic closeness was to be reinforced, when, as a logical
extension of his ‘sunshine policy’, the incoming Kim Dae-jung not
only expressed no reservations about Japan developing closer links
with North Korea but even positively welcomed such a tendency.
President Roh Tae Woo, back in 1988, had announced a policy in
which he expressed support for any improvement in the North’s
relations with countries friendly to the South, but in practice the
South Koreans had continued to watch with extreme caution any
Japanese moves in the North’s direction. Kim Dae-jung adopted a
much more relaxed approach. Not that there was much change
immediately after Kim took up office, for Japan-North Korean
normalisation negotiations had been on hold since 1992 as a result of
disputes over a number of issues and, indeed, official Japanese views
only hardened as a result of a North Korean missile test in 1998, in
which a Taepodong missile flew over Japanese territory, and spy
ship incursions in 1999. This meant that as Kim explored ways to
‘warm up’ North Korea, culminating in the historic summit in
Pyongyang in June 2000, and the Clinton administration also toyed
with better relations with the North, Japan seemed to be lagging well
behind (a brief flurry of contacts with the North in mid-2000 soon
petered out).
Let us consider the two-pronged approach of ‘pressure’ or
containment and ‘dialogue’ or engagement towards North Korea
which all the three ‘allies’ have employed to varying degrees since
the early 1990s (Kim, Tadokoro and Bridges 2003). Both Kim
Dae-jung and his successor Roh have put much greater emphasis on
the engagement mode. In contrast to the engagement policy of
Clinton in his second administration (it should be remembered that
in 1994 he was actually very close to a military strike against North
Korean facilities), Bush has put more emphasis on containment,
albeit using pressure in a multilateral context. For Japan since 1992,
when normalisation talks with the North collapsed, the balance has
been tilted towards containment, though never far enough to
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contemplate serious sanctions. Despite the high profile visits to
Pyongyang in September 2002 and May 2004 by prime minister
Koizumi, which brought partial but ultimately frustrating progress
on the particular stumbling-block of the kidnapped Japanese citizens,
the engagement mode has remained subordinate to the containment
imperative (Hughes 2002; Izumi 2004). The Japanese government’s
hands have been tied by the strength of public opinion in Japan,
which is strongly anti-North Korean, whereas in South Korea there
is much more of a split in public opinion over the desirability or
otherwise of conciliation towards the North, so allowing the Roh
administration more flexibility. In addition, there is rather limited
support for the Japanese case over the kidnapped Japanese amongst
South Koreans with memories of those many Koreans that
disappeared under Japanese rule.
Yet, despite the apparent divergences between the current Japanese
rhetorical hard line and the more conciliatory approach of the Roh
administration towards the North, there may be some underlying
similarity in their thinking, not least in their shared reluctance to use
armed force to resolve the North Korean issue. Given the Japanese
aversion to military action and even caution - though this caution has
been losing efficacy recently - over economic sanctions on the
Korean peninsula, it seems that both Japan and South Korea prefer a
‘changed regime’ rather than a ‘regime change’ in the North
(Konishi 2004).
‘People power’
The above term does not imply the sense associated with the popular
movement for democracy in the Philippines in the mid-1980s, but
rather the concept of formal and informal institutional linkages
discussed by Feldman (1999), in order to consider the ways in which
the flows of people and popular culture and interactions between
organisations have been impacting on the bilateral relationship.
After the South Korean government loosened restrictions on
overseas travel in 1987, the numbers of South Koreans visiting Japan
increased steadily, from 809,000 in 1989 to 1.4 million in 2003 and
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1.56 million last year. Similarly Japanese visitors to South Korea
also increased steadily from the mid-1980s, passed the million mark
for the first time in 1989 and rising to 1.8 million in 2003 and 2.43
million last year (an increase of around 35% in one year alone).
Regular shuttle flights go between Kinpo and Haneda airports and
23 Japanese cities have direct air-links with South Korean
counterparts. Events such as the co-hosted football World Cup in
2002 undoubtedly contributed to the exchange of peoples. In the
1980s and even into the 1990s a high proportion of the Japanese
visitors were middle-aged men, presumably either businessmen or
participants in ‘sex tours’, but the most recent trend, inspired by the
attraction of visiting the sites of popular Korean dramas, has been
for a marked increase in the numbers of Japanese women, especially
middle-aged women.
Both governments have been slowly loosening visa restrictions to
help these flows of people. South Koreans are being given
visa-free access from March-September this year to encourage
visitors to the Aichi World Expo, with the possibility that this
concession may be extended (Japan Times, 5 June 2004; Chosun
Ilbo, 28 March 2005). South Korea currently allows Japanese
visa-free entry for up to 30 days and is considering extending this
period.
The popular interactions have been mostly demonstrably affected by
the qualitative jump in popular culture flows in recent years. The
Korean TV drama series ‘Winter Sonata’ has been aired four times
on Japanese TV in the past 3 years and within the first year after it
was aired the first time in Japan, NHK, the Japanese state
broadcaster managed to sell 150,000 DVDs and videos, a million
copies of the novel and 300,000 guidebooks for the drama.
‘Yon-sama’ became the ‘word of the year’ in Japan in 2004 and the
drama’s star was even honoured with a snow sculpture of himself at
the Sapporo Snow Festival in February 2005. In the leading Japanese
film magazine, Kinema Jumpo, four of the top ten foreign films in
Japan last year were Korean (Chosun Ilbo internet edition, 7 January
2005).
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Important also are the increased number of formal and informal
linkages between the two countries, through exchanges and contacts
between students, academics, non-governmental organisations,
media organisations, and sports and cultural bodies. These lead to a
slow but steady thickening of the bilateral relationship. To give a
few examples, firstly a survey in December 2004 showed Korean
had overtaken German and French in terms of popularity as a foreign
language taught in Japanese high schools (Chosun Ilbo internet
edition, 9 January 2005), secondly, Seoul National University
announced the setting up of its first ever Japan studies centre (Nihon
keizai shimbun, 14 April 2004), and, thirdly, sumo wrestling
tournaments in Seoul and Pusan in February 2004 proved immensely
popular (Korea Times, 23 November 2004). However, the current
bilateral political disputes may interrupt at least some of these
exchanges for a short while.
Two steps forward and one step back?
The analysis above suggests a slowly improving bilateral
relationship, albeit one which is still subject to strong emotional
surges and responses to perceived slights on both sides. But does
that mean that real reconciliation is occurring?
Recent literature on the concept of reconciliation suggests that a
mixture of moral imperative and pragmatic interest is crucial to
developing new and constructive relationships between former
enemies. According to the framework developed by Feldman, the
exact mix and consequent progress (or lack of progress) in
reconciliation seems to revolve around four variables: the
confrontation with the past, the degree of institutionalized
transformation, the skill of political leaders, and the configuration of
the international environment (Feldman 1999, pp. 334-37).
Looking at these four variables, it has to be said that the
history-related issues, on which South Korea clearly has moral
leverage, remain potent in the relationship. History has been painful
and demanding in the case of Korea-Japan relations and, as the
recent flare-up suggests, the process of reconciliation in this aspect is
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by no means complete. Japan’s efforts to come to terms with its past,
at first begrudging but recently more forthcoming, have remained
problematic in both countries - seen as not sufficient in South Korea
and seen in Japan as bowing too much to South Korean demands.
Secondly, the slow but steady process of institutionalisation of
governmental, business and societal networks and contacts has
proceeded positively, despite occasional hiccups. Ministers from
both countries meet increasingly regularly, as do officials from
different ministries and agencies. Even exchanges and consultations
amongst defence-related officials, long taboo, have become more
evident since the late 1990s (Lee and Moon 2002, p.150). Links
between politicians have long been in place, although generational
change, particularly on the South Korean side, make these personal
linkages occasionally intermittent. From the early 1990s Japanese
prime ministers and South Korean presidents began to meet more
frequently and with less fan-fare, and since 2002 there have been
regular six-monthly informal working (or ‘no necktie’) summits in
alternate countries. The two major business organisations, Japan’s
Keidanren and South Korea’s Federation of Korean Industries, have
frequent meetings and, for example, since 2001 they have lobbied
together for the conclusion of a bilateral FTA. The growing
economic interdependence, no longer such a one-sided economic
power equation, provides positive influences. Non-governmental
organisations in both countries too have extended their contacts in
recent years, aided no doubt by the strong interest in using the
internet in both populations. The heightened interest in the popular
culture and tourist sites of the other country also acts in a beneficial
manner (in one recent survey of Japanese who admitted that their
views of South Korea had improved in recent years, 80% pointed to
Korean films and dramas as a reason. Nihon keizai shimbun, 20
December 2004)
Thirdly, leaders do make a difference. The positive role of Kim
Dae-jung was discussed earlier, but what about the second period,
namely this year? Is President Roh now willing to risk reversing
these positive developments? Roh was careful in his remarks on
1st March to reaffirm the position which he had adopted since
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becoming president, namely that the past history would not be made
a ‘diplomatic issue’ with Japan, but he seemed to be implying that he
was expecting some kind of voluntary gesture from the Japanese
(Korea Herald, 2 March 2005). His remarks might better be
analysed in the light of the domestic political situation, where Roh
has already been conducting a campaign to review Korea’s modern
history during both the colonial period and the postwar authoritarian
dictatorships (Korea Herald, 6 November 2004). Although this
campaign actually led at an early stage to the resignation of the
leader of the ruling Uri Party (South China Morning Post, 20 August
2004), it seemed more likely that it was intended to discomfort the
opposition Grand National Party, which is led by the daughter of
former military strongman Park Chung-hee, during whose rule the
Basic Treaty with Japan was concluded. A more short-term objective
may have been to gain political mileage before a number of tricky
by-elections, which the Uri party needed to win in order to restore its
recently-lost wafer-thin majority in the National Assembly, in late
April (although the Uri failed to win even one, so the anti-Japanese
campaign’s impact was minimal in that sense). Nonetheless, it is too
simplistic to say that domestic political considerations account solely
for this new approach, since Roh’s comments certainly have had
resonance with many Koreans.
On the Japanese side, Koizumi’s approach also has had an impact on
bilateral relations. Koizumi is nothing if not a nationalist and, while
his primary focus has been on domestic economic restructuring, he
has also wanted to push Japan into a more activist role in
international relations. It is perhaps ironic, therefore, that despite his
two path-breaking visits to Pyongyang in September 2002 and May
2004, Japan has been forced back into a stalemate position on
relations with North Korea because of the kidnapped Japanese issue
and that, at the same time, part of his domestic agenda - a desire to
regularly honour Japanese war dead at the Yasukuni shrine - has
helped to constrain more dynamic relations with South Korea.
The Japanese had been watching warily Roh’s historical review
campaign since last year, not wishing to intervene but aware that it
could easily overflow into anti-Japanism; Japanese officials also
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tried to play down Roh’s 1st March remarks as being a ‘message’ to
his domestic audience (Nihon keizai shimbun, 5 March 2005). The
Japanese Foreign Ministry has found itself in a difficult position
over the Shimane prefectural government’s decision to designate
‘Takeshima Day’, being constitutionally limited in what it can do to
dissuade local politicians from such actions and being forced to call
for calm on both sides for the sake of the broader Japan-South
Korean partnership in North-east Asia (Japan Times, 17 March
2005, Nihon keizai shimbun, 17 March 2005). Although President
Roh did talk of his willingness to risk a ‘diplomatic war’, he has also
made it clear that he does not want to go as far as cutting off
relations with Japan and, indeed, since Koizumi’s speech at the
Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta on 22 April 2005 in which he
expressed his ‘deep remorse and heartfelt apology’ for Japan’s past
actions, South Korean official statements have adopted a calmer
tone. Now the ball is in Koizumi’s court; if he does not visit
Yasukuni shrine in the near future, then relations can be set back on
a more even keel.
Finally, the changing international context. Since the end of the Cold
War, a shared belief in peace and stability in North-east Asia has
been drawing the two countries closer together. As discussed above,
there are subtle differences of approach, particularly between the
Roh and Koizumi administrations, in dealing with North Korea, but
also apparent is a basic agreement that force is not the way to end
the current impasse over the nuclear crisis. Both countries also
appreciate the need to consult over the economic and military rise of
China and the tendency of the Americans, particularly under the
Bush administration, to act in ways which are occasionally
unsettling to their Asian allies. While strains in the US-South Korean
relationship have been more marked than in the US-Japanese
relationship in recent years, the trilateral coordination with regard to
KEDO and other aspects of the North Korean issue, plus the
involvement of Japan and South Korea in the six-party talks, do
provide further opportunities for interaction on political and security
issues which cannot be handled so comfortably on a bilateral basis.
Indeed, through participation in trilateral and multilateral formats,
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Japan is probably now more actively involved in Korean security
issues than at any time in the last six decades.
As Caroline Rose, in her study of Sino-Japanese relations has
argued, reconciliation ‘is a future-oriented, joint endeavour between
the victims and perpetrators, but one that is lengthy, complex and
prone to failure’ (Rose 2005, p. 21). There is likely to be no easy
path to full reconciliation in Japan-Korean relations, but it is to be
hoped that the two countries can steadily work through these
bilateral problems and in turn provide a contribution to the larger
problem of a structured and stable peace framework for North-east
Asia. The four variables of reconciliation discussed above provide a
mixed picture in the case of Japan-South Korean relations. Some
such as the growing institutionalisation of bilateral linkages and the
changing international environment can enhance reconciliation,
whereas others such as the leaders’ personalities and policies and the
regular resuscitation of historical problems slow down the process.
President Roh intends to receive Koizumi in Seoul on 20 June at one
of their regular half-yearly meetings. If both he and Koizumi are
prepared to once again look forward, then hopefully this can be the
first step towards returning to the road of reconciliation.
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